

NEW
RUSSIA
IN THE
BALANCE

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NEW RUSSIA IN THE BALANCE

How Germany's Designs
May Be Defeated and
Russian Democracy
Preserved.

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News in Russia.

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The special cable dispatches from Moscow that are here presented are reprinted from the columns of The Chicago Daily News, which received them from Louis Edgar Browne, its staff correspondent in Russia. Mr. Browne has been in the thick of events in that distracted country since the first days of the provisional government which came into existence soon after the downfall of the czar. These dispatches—which were almost the last to come out of Russia before German influences seriously affected the telegraph lines in Finland—throw much new light on obscure points in the recent history of the new republic. They also outline a program of action for the United States government that in the opinion of Mr. Browne and certain other Americans now in Moscow would rescue Russian democracy from the sinister designs of Germany and might even cause Russia once more to become a positive factor in the war against the central powers. This program, with the facts and views on which it is based, manifestly is entitled to receive careful consideration from the authorities in Washington, from American business interests and from the American public generally.



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I.

DEFECTS OF THE KERENSKY GOVERNMENT.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS.

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Moscow, Russia, April 11.—Three years ago visionaries in the allied nations dreamed that Berlin would fall before the Russian steam roller. To-day the same visionaries, now pessimists, condemn Russia as a quitter among the nations, not seeing in this vast country a future aid in the world war for democracy. The majority of newspaper readers in the allied countries probably suspect or believe that the Russian soviet government sold out to Germany and that the soviet leaders are paid agents of the kaiser. These are equally fatuous ideas.

False interpretations of facts and rumors that are cabled to the various allied countries regarding the revolution have confused and misled many students of political movements, whose judgment of the situation has been accepted as final. Thus there exists a tendency in the allied countries to abandon Russia as a hopeless liability, such action being excused by frequent reiteration of the theory that the soviet leaders are German agents.

In the last six months no definite policy toward Russia that might have been adopted by the allies would have changed Russia from a bad liability to a substantial asset. Now six months of disastrous revolutionary adventure have put a new complexion on the situation.

Aroused by German Duplicity.

We in Russia who are actually in contact with the soviet government discern the possibility of Russia's again becoming a contributing member of the allies' coalition. We see the soviet government a real power with a firm grip on the internal situation. We see the soviet government furious because of the shameful peace Germany forced upon it. We see the soviet's growing resentment against Germany. We feel the sentiment of the

Russian people harden against Germany. We see this resentment crystallizing in Russia's efforts to create a revolutionary army and the hurried evacuation of munitions to depots beyond the Volga in preparation for the expected resumption of German attacks.

Above all, we feel the new revolutionary spirit demanding war against Germany, which spirit is the direct result of the growing conviction of the Russian masses that Germany menaces the existence of free Russia. We realize that the Russian debacle was a catastrophe to the allies and that it prolonged the war. This is ample reason for assisting Russia to recover some of her lost prestige.

How Can the Allies Aid Russia?

How much the allies may expect of Russia depends entirely upon two things:

First, how well we foster the spirit of resentment against Germany, and,

Second, how efficiently and materially we aid the soviet government in its effort to put Russia on a war basis.

The Russian situation, when one views the possibilities it is likely to have and the interest it will excite among the allied peoples in the next few months, is such that I feel the necessity of outlining the conclusions drawn by the controlling group representing the allies in Russia from the teachings of the last seven months of Russian history. Save for insignificant exceptions, American diplomatic and military representatives indorse the main ideas expressed in the series of cable dispatches that I am sending to The Daily News, of which this is the first.

Faults of the Kerensky Government.

When the American missions began co-operating with Alexander Kerensky two glaring faults were disclosed in the provisional government.

First, that government was built on the foundations of the old regime. This meant that the new socialistic order was trying to utilize the bars of bureaucracy.

Second, the provisional government was utterly unable to organize the country's food supply. Although American investigation proved that Russia had sufficient food to feed herself, the cumbersome

routine of the autocracy proved too inelastic to meet the demands of the revolution. Wherever Kerensky turned he found hostility; whatever he tried to do met with passive resistance, which was as effective as active opposition.

Old Bureaucracy Fought Kerensky.

The allies' military and technical units complained of lack of progress. A member of the American railway mission said: "We cannot help the Russians if they will not help themselves." Kerensky's government stirred up the inertia of the old regime, but the machinery was slowing down. The inability of the provisional government to handle the food situation was largely due to the rottenness of the governmental mechanism, and it furnished all of Kerensky's enemies with a common target for attack. Extensive co-operation was necessary, but the corrupt bureaucracy did not respond to Kerensky's efforts.

Kerensky's position was made more difficult by the war speculators. The American mission found the food prices entirely disproportionate to the cost of other commodities. Prices of manufactured articles were inflated to ten or a dozen times the normal prices, while the price of food was arbitrarily decreed at thrice its normal value. Result: The peasants refused to exchange foodstuffs for currency because of the distortion of the normal relative values. They preferred to barter grain for absolutely needed manufactured articles, hoarding their surplus grain.

Shorn of Power by the Soviet.

If Kerensky had actually possessed the power he might have oiled up the old machine and solved the food difficulty. But Kerensky was without power. The soviet had usurped it. Visible at every turn, alternately leading and frustrating the provisional government, was the soviet. It was virile and active, although as yet openly unobtrusive. The soviet's power was the direct result of gigantic propaganda that had already won over with timeworn formulas large groups of soldiers and the peasant masses.

Whenever Kerensky's duma moved it encountered the solid substance of the

soviet power. A clash invariably resulted and the soviet invariably won.

Then America entered the game. This was in August.

American Red Cross at Work.

America sent a Red Cross mission to Russia which, under the force of circumstances, erected itself into a political mission. This unofficial effort mitigated the mistake which all the allies made regarding the new Russia. For purposes of war the various allied nations selected as their representatives in Russia men who through temperament and training were fitted to work in harmony with the czar's autocratic regime. The revolution came and practically none of these representatives was replaced by a man more in tune with the situation. The old representatives of the allies were as much out of sympathy with the new socialistic order as were the supporters of the overthrown autocracy.

The American Red Cross mission—now almost wholly a political mission—realized that when the czar fell the fundamental bond of Russian life was lost and there existed no common unity of patriotism to hold Russia together. The Russian people lived for the czar and warred for the czar. The ideals of patriotism crystallized in the czar's person. Some new bond was essential. It was necessary to create patriotism or something representing patriotism. Throughout Russia were scores of groups acting individually with no apparent desire for cohesion.

Vision of the American Mission.

The American mission believed that attempts to re-establish the old bond were foredoomed to failure, because under it only about 6 per cent of the population had a real stake in the nation, while since the revolution 90 per cent had tasted freedom and ownership. There existed a solid mass of 15,000,000 soldiers against the re-establishment. Thus the Korniloff, Kaledines and Alexieff moves were destined to failure, although this was better realized after a few bitter experiences.

Russia's need of a new bond suggested to the American mission a definite course of action—namely, amalgamation and continued co-operation of the political

and military elements of the new Russia as a preliminary essential; then the inauguration of a vast educational campaign seeking to create a new patriotic unity in an ideal of "a free Russia, land for the peasants, freeholds and firesides." Nothing could be done without the coalition of the military and political elements, which had been growing more estranged. Consequently the Korniloff plot was hatched.

Leaf from the French Revolution.

The plan interested the American mission. The Korniloff-Kerensky amalgamation was first to solve the food problem, which furnished the main basis of attack against the Kerensky government, and then co-operate in educating the soldiers and peasants as to Germany's true character. It was hoped that the effort would culminate in the creation of a Russian revolutionary army, the counterpart in spirit of the French revolutionary army.

II. THE DOWNFALL OF KEREN- SKY.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS.
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Moscow, Russia, April 12.—On Aug. 15, 1917, members of the American Red Cross mission attended a conference, at which Kerensky, Savinkoff, Nekrassoff and Skobelloff discussed with them the details of a coup d'etat to effect an amalgamation of the Korniloff and Kerensky forces. The next day Kerensky, Korniloff and the American mission met in the Winter palace and further discussed details of the plan. All urged its speedy execution, as the soviet's attacks because of the food situation and also the soviet's peace campaign were rapidly undermining the positions of both Kerensky and the allies in Russia.

Kerensky and Korniloff agreed to join forces and co-operate with the United States. They agreed to meet the pressing food difficulty by appointing M. Batolin food dictator. Batolin was the Russian wheat magnate whose wizardlike foresight and almost superhuman powers of organization enabled him to become probably the largest single human factor in Russia's industrial and commercial life, despite the handicap of his birth in a peasant's hovel.

Hoover Was to Be a Factor.

The tentative economic agreement between Russia and America proposed that Mr. Hoover and other allied food specialists should be brought into the conference. America was to export to Russia certain foodstuffs in exchange for platinum and other metals, beet seed, flax and hides. Kerensky and Korniloff agreed jointly to sign a proclamation to this effect guaranteeing a permanent food supply to the Russian people and using America's name. They were to conduct a ruthless campaign against speculators, invoking the death penalty, if necessary. Both Kerensky and Korniloff were hopeful. They laid great stress on the necessity of America's co-operation.

Despite the urgent need of immediate action, the plan hung fire until the American mission, recognizing the soviet's rapidly rising power, advised Korniloff and Kerensky to abandon the plan entirely. Korniloff and Kerensky obstinately refused. Then came their attempt. As a coup d'etat a more miserable fiasco was never seen. Everything went wrong. But the failure was no mystery. It was the soviet which, learning of the plot, sprang into activity, showing unsuspected depths of organization.

Soviet's Coup Was Well Planned.

Overnight the soviet's power became a factor of equal consideration with that of the provisional government. This was not accidental. It was the culmination of weeks of untiring and skillful leadership. The Kerensky-Korniloff plot and the soviet counterplot popped simultaneously. Kronstadt sailors hurried to Petrograd under the thin pretext of guarding Kerensky. The sailors surrounded the winter palace, virtually held Kerensky a prisoner and forced him to repudiate his pledges to Korniloff. They forced him to sign a decree denouncing Korniloff as a counter-revolutionary. The movement was crushed in twenty-four hours.

The soviet's maneuvers opened a new phase of the situation which disclosed Kerensky's lack of power. They made plain the fact that Kerensky was running a socialistic government with the machinery of an autocracy and was thus building on a false foundation. A wholly socialistic organization was striving to overthrow both Kerensky and Korniloff. On the one hand Kerensky talked the old world politics and diplomacy of the allies; on the other he shouted the most radical and excited views of the Russian masses. The two things did not mix. The opposition was the soviet conducting revolutionary, socialistic antiwar propaganda. Its formula, "peace, land and bread," was sweet music to the Russian ear, being just what it wanted to hear.

Captivated Army of 15,000,000.

Kerensky's declaration, "We will fight until the bitter end," did not stand a show. Psychologically the arguments of

the soviet agitators captivated the Russian masses. The Russian soldiers fought Germany 'because the czar so ordered. The czar was gone. Where was there reason for fighting any further? Consequently the soviet's formula, "Peace for the soldiers," appealed to 15,000,000 soldiers.

"No annexations and no contributions" was a formula so often reiterated that it was finally accepted as a beautiful principle. The soldiers said: "We have our villages on the Volga. There is land enough for all. Why should we take Constantinople? It does not belong to us and we do not want it."

The formula, "The land to the peasants," appealed to the masses. The soviet told the soldiers: "The revolution gave you land; go and take it." Ever present in the soldier's mind was the fear that unless he went home he might be overlooked when the land was divided. The soviet made the most of this argument.

"Industries to the Workmen."

As a corollary to "The land to the peasants" there was "The industries to the workmen." In all, the soviet so worked upon the soldiers and the peasant workmen that all of them believed that because the czar was deposed further need of waging the czar's war did not exist and also that the fruits of the revolution should immediately be enjoyed in full.

Logical western minds found it easy to answer this fallacious reasoning. The masses of western Europe understood that behind the victorious German bayonets lurked the old order for Russia, with its dungeons, its misery and its brutality. They understood that a German victory meant the return of the landed aristocrats, barons and grand dukes. Western Europe was fully conscious of the dreadful German menace to democratic culture. But the simple Russian soldier, nothing but an illiterate Russian peasant clad in khaki, applied primitive, not practical, tests. He reasoned:

"Why should we fight our German brother, who is forced to fight by his kaiser war lord just as the czar forced us to fight? We have overthrown our

oppressor. We will tell them how it was done. They will overthrow their kaiser and we will live happily side by side—two great peoples enjoying full freedom.”

American Mission to the Rescue.

The American mission decided that swift educational work on a larger scale than ever before attempted was necessary to teach the Russian masses the fatuity of this beautiful dream. It was hoped to put an X-ray on Germany and show the Russian masses that if Germany were victorious the new freedom would be displaced by the re-establishment of the old order and also that German victory would restore the newly acquired land to the hands of the nobles. The American mission decided that the old revolutionary group led by Mme. Breshovskaya, “the grandmother of the revolution,” with Tchaikowsky and Lazereff was the best medium for conducting an educational campaign.

The plan contemplated thousands of speakers lecturing in the armies and the villages on the subject of the German menace; millions of pamphlets in simple Russian and intelligible to the smallest village scribes; posters, placards and colored cartoons scattered broadcast.

This educational campaign was to answer the soviet’s slogan. “Peace for the soldier, land to the peasants, factories to the workmen and bread for all.” The soviet was spending millions on its own propaganda. It employed thousands of speakers and issued tons of printed matter.

Plan for a Vast Publicity Campaign.

The American mission asked the American government for \$1,000,000 immediately and \$3,000,000 a month indefinitely for the purpose of combating the soviet propaganda. Previously Elihu Root had recommended \$10,000,000 for publicity.

Six weeks after the American mission’s request Washington sent to Russia a branch of the committee on public information, which proceeded to tell the Russians how many aeroplanes America was building, how great an army America expected to raise and how America was certain ultimately to win the war. Neither America nor the allies ever made one

serious attempt to combat the soviet's peace propaganda and to explain to the Russian people why Germany really menaced their newly won freedom. Seventy per cent of the Russian masses are uneducated, according to western standards. No one ever told the Russian masses about the German menace. How can we expect them to understand it except through experience? It seemed as though the allied representatives were completely oblivious of the growing power of the soviet.

Meanwhile the soviet's power was strengthening and the soviet formulas undermined the allied influence. Kerensky became weaker and weaker. The allied political and military missions, except the American Red Cross and political mission, completely misunderstanding the situation, charged Kerensky with ruining the army and misusing the allies' confidence.

Allies' Stiff Note to Kerensky.

It will be remembered that on the eve of Kerensky's downfall the allied ambassadors, excepting the American ambassador, who had received no instructions, presented Kerensky with a stiff note of protest, amounting almost to an ultimatum against conditions in Russia. This note is a part of the secret treaty publications. The allies hindered and persecuted Kerensky, whereas an active effort to explain why Germany menaced Russia might have frustrated the narcotic effect of the soviet's formulas.

Three days before the soviet's coup d'etat was delivered a conference was held. Kerensky met the allied military representatives in the rooms of the American mission. He declared that he commanded the support of four Petrograd regiments, perhaps enough to defeat the soviet forces, but Kerensky refused to remain in power unless he was assured by the allies of full support for the Russian policy, which Kerensky himself dictated. He was tired of telling the allies what they insisted on hearing through the mouth of the silver tongued Terestchenko while he himself was telling the Russian people something quite different.

Instead of discussing a concrete plan for downing the soviet, the military representatives indulged in a general denunciation of the policy of the provisional government and each painful detail of the Tarnopol and Riga retreats. Kerensky admitted all these charges, but he did not see how he could have changed events.

No Constructive Action Taken.

Every attempt to reach an understanding resulted in mutual recrimination. The meeting lasted two hours, and despite the urgent pressure of the American mission not a single constructive action was taken. The allied missions favored supporting Kaledines and Alexieff as against Kerensky. They scouted the possibility that the soviet might overthrow the provisional government. Yet this virile soviet organization had swept before it every military unit, village and community into which it penetrated. It had overcome obstacle after obstacle, defeated Korniloff, gained the support of the majority of the bayonets at the front and assumed control of the Baltic and Kronstadt fleets.

The allied military missions hardly sensed this power. Yet Kerensky reiterated the necessity of the allies trusting him to deal exclusively with the Russian situation. Kerensky's demand was not answered.

Blow Falls; Flight of Kerensky.

Then came the blow. In five days all was over and Kerensky fled, a hunted fugitive. The allies then faced a new situation. The soviet controlled the government, the rifles and the masses. The soviet's program pledged Russia to the formula of peace. The soviet had what Kerensky never had—power—the reason being that the soviet promised the Russian people just what the Russian people wanted, namely, peace, land and bread. How to utilize this new situation as a factor in winning the world war for the allies became the burning problem of the day.

III.

AMERICAN RED CROSS WINS RUSSIA'S TRUST.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS.

[Copyright, 1918, The Chicago Daily News Co.]

Moscow, Russia, April 13.—When the soviet power seized the Petrograd government in November, the ambassadors from the entente countries were torn between two desires. The stronger was to remain in Russia, wholly ignoring the soviet government and anxiously awaiting its downfall; the weaker was to quit Russia altogether. Not one realized the necessity of utilizing or co-operating with the soviet for the purposes of the world war.

Among all the allied institutions in Russia only one little group understood the situation—namely, the American Red Cross mission. It realized that the soviet was not then a positive factor in the struggle against Germany, but it also realized that the soviet was so secure in its position that not even the concentrated efforts of all the other political elements in Russia could seriously threaten the soviet government's hold on Russia.

This small American unit was then unable to swing the allied policy of the old diplomats sent to Russia. The latter were equipped to negotiate with the czar and could not accommodate themselves to the changed conditions. They failed to understand that the soviet power had come to stay.

Predicted Early End of Soviet.

Two of the ambassadors told me, "The soviet is unable to last longer than ten days." Ten days passed, yet the soviet was secure. After two months the diplomats were still whispering, "The soviet will last only a couple of weeks more." The allied diplomatic and military group even attempted to expedite the soviet's downfall.

The military chief wrote notes to Doukhonin, Alexleff and other leaders of the opposition to the soviet. The allied mili-

tarists supported Roumania and the Ukraine; both sold out to Germany. They flirted with the Finnish white guards. France even recognized the white guard government—German soldiers are now fighting side by side with these white guards.

The little Red Cross group from the United States saw the soviet as an unpleasant but a necessary evil, and began to co-operate with it. The Red Cross weathered attack after attack. Diplomats and militarists alike condemned the overtures to the soviet government.

Now, in the sixth month of the soviet rule, there exists just one lane of approach to the soviet government, and that is through the American Red Cross. The allies appear at this time to be anxious to talk to Lenine and Trotzky. Tentative overtures are made daily. Britain has withdrawn her embassy and substituted as her official representative a young liberal, Lockhart. Though not a diplomat, he recognizes the permanency of the soviet power and the necessity of co-operation with it. Already he has recovered some of the lost ground. He is not entangled with the old regime and consequently the soviet leaders trust him and co-operate with him.

Soviet Trusts American Red Cross.

But it was the American Red Cross that made possible any resumption of negotiations with the soviet. To-day it is the only allied institution in Russia that the soviet really trusts. It is about the only allied institution that since November has not been actively interested in some scheme seeking to accomplish the soviet's downfall.

Originally there existed differences between the bolsheviki and the soviet. To-day these terms are practically synonymous. The bolsheviki utilized the soviet organization until they became one with it. In order to grasp what the soviet power in Russia really means one must define "What is the soviet?"

The soviet organization extends deep into Russian life. Literally the soviet means the council of common usage; it means a village council. Thus the modern Russian soviet's origin is the ancient village mir.

Where the Soviet Gets Its Power.

Russia's present official title is "The Russian Socialistic Federated Republic of Soviets." The present day Russian soviet government is really only the executive committee of a vast number of local village, town and city soviets in which there exists a real sound democratic idea of majority rule. The village soviets hold local elections and select members to attend the all-Russian congress of soviets. This congress chooses the government. It was such an organization that ratified the Russo-German peace.

The bolsheviki were extreme socialists. They perfected the organization of a central clearing house for these thousands of soviets. They used this organization to spread their propaganda and won over to their point of view 95 per cent of the soldiers and 80 per cent of the peasant masses. The soviet program was impossibly radical. It proposed impractical reforms. The bolshevik ideas are the narrow outgrowth of sixty years of forced, secret revolutionary work.

Soviet is Largely Atheistic.

We can hardly expect these revolutionists to possess modern ideals, when they saw mostly only the seamy side of the czar's regime. Already a century behind the times, the revolutionary workers became atheists. The soviet is largely atheistic in tendency. The Russian church was so bound up with the czar that the masses say: "The church belonged to the czar. It was the czar's instrument. We do not trust the czar."

But, regardless of their atheism and their fatuous, impossible reasoning, the bolsheviki swept the country completely, coming to dominate the national organization of the village soviets. And in sweeping the country the bolsheviki became one with the soviet. The conservative representatives of allied countries reasoned that the bolsheviki, now the soviet leaders, were simply hired agents of Germany. They knew that Lenine came through Germany in a sealed car. They said that Trotzky was notoriously anti-British. They declared that the soviet program was "made in Berlin."

Lenine did come to Russia through Berlin. The bolsheviki did perhaps accept

money from Germany. They explain that by saying, "We would accept money from the devil himself in aid of our cause." There exists an old saying that you may give a fanatic money, but you cannot buy him. Germany undoubtedly regrets Lenin's passage through Berlin; certainly the Germans regret the money given to the bolshevik propaganda which threatens to boomerang back on Austria. Lenin did not utter a single new word of extreme socialism. He and his associates made use of the most radical ready made arguments available because, knowing the psychology of the Russian masses, they understood that the arguments, "Peace, land, bread and factory control," would appeal to 93 per cent of the mass because the individuals of this mass never before owned even their own souls.

Formula Not Made in Berlin.

Perhaps Germany crystallized things by urging bolshevik work in Russia, but the bolshevik formula was never made in Berlin. "The land for the peasants" is a reiteration of the Fourier-Proudhon scheme based on the idea that "all land belongs to the tillers of the soil," proposed in France in 1842. "Control of industries by the workingman" is only the Pfert program of 1876 and "peace for the soldier" is the formula of the international published in the communist manifesto of 1884 which expounded the theory that the autocratic ruling classes made wars to allay discontent at home and also for the purposes of imperialistic exploitation and the acquisition of foreign territories.

IV.

RUSSIAN HATRED OF GER- MANY GROWS.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS.

[Copyright, 1918, The Chicago Daily News Co.]

Moscow, Russia, April 13 (delayed).—

The soviet pledged itself to the peace program. The program was impossible of fulfillment. The soviet tried it and found it wanting. The soviet was forced to sign a peace which even itself regarded as shameful. The peace negotiations and their result caused the scales to fall from the Russian eyes, and the truth is gradually being driven home. The peace negotiations showed Germany in her true light and proved her greedy desire for aggrandizement. The peace program resulted in disaster.

Now the soviet admits that its policy was wrong. Its other extreme ideals are gradually being modified or discarded as wholly impracticable. Workmen's control of industry, repudiation of the national debt and nationalization of the banks are all sliding toward a less radical position. Through bitter experience the soviet is learning that many of its projects are absolutely impracticable, but once the impracticability of a scheme is demonstrated the soviet shows a tendency to abandon it in favor of a more moderate plan or else it abandons the scheme altogether.

German Poison Soon Reacted.

Germany pumped extreme socialism into Russia, which received it with such unexpected rapidity and violence that the poison reacted and poured back into Germany, causing alarm in Berlin. Many of Germany's 3,200,000 socialist voters were susceptible to maximalist arguments, and Berlin had strikes. Austria, the weak sister, was already tainted with the same poison that destroyed old Russia. If Russia again goes to war we can rely upon her conducting a gigantic revolutionary campaign against Germany. The German people are probably too sensible to listen to her seriously, but one must remember that the popu-

lation of Austria is mainly Slavic and akin to the Russian Slavs. The Russian Slavs fell hard for extreme socialism. Why should not the Austrian Slavs do so as well?

We now come to the present day phase of the situation. The soviet is as powerful as ever, despite its signature to a shameful peace treaty and its evacuation of the capital. The soviet government to-day is as real as the Russian people. There exist within the country no visible forces that can oust the soviet from power. The soviet pledged itself to a program of peace. The soviet made peace and now finds that it is a peace in name only and not in fact. The soviet remembers the threat of Gen. Hoffman, the German peace delegate, who said that Germany invaded Russia for the purpose of exterminating the bolshéviki (the soviet), who endangered civilization.

Germany Wars on Russian People.

The soviet is not deceived by the false peace which Germany dictated or the present existing calm. It expects further attention from the German army as soon as things are quiet on the western front. Germany's war against the soviet means war against the Russian people. For the first time the Russian people see Germany as a menace to themselves individually. Formerly they saw the Germans only as a menace to their czar.

Consequently there is growing up throughout the country, in every village and every household, the knowledge that peace is impossible and that if Russia is to avoid a return to autocracy Germany must be beaten.

In the early days we might have brought this home through education. Experience, although it has nearly wrecked the nation in the process, has convinced the Russians with more vividness than education ever could have done.

The bolshéviki are decidedly unpleasant bedfellows. They are extremely hard to work with. The soviet is a new, crude, extremely narrow and uncompromising government, but the soviet is convinced that further war with Germany is unavoidable.

Thus the allies, after five months of despair over the Russian situation, at last have something to look for. Things have gone far in Russia. Lenine says: "The present situation is better than the one we will have in the near future. In April and May there will probably be no bread at all, and the railways will be overloaded with prisoners returning from Germany and finally they will stop working altogether."

Wrath at Germany Growing.

It is doubtful if the allies can do much with the situation. But we are not so sure of winning the war that we can afford to overlook anything, no matter how small. Perhaps Russia will not put a large organized army in the field. She may cost us much useless labor and a large amount of money, but the soviet knows that it must fight Germany again and the country knows it. This knowledge is expressed in every speech of the soviet leaders, and every newspaper is discussing the probability of again fighting Germany. Every village orator blames Germany for Russia's trials and tribulations. For the first time revolutionary Russia has a hard, real bond. It has a tangible spirit for war.

V.

SAVING RUSSIA A TASK FOR THE ALLIES.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS.

[Copyright, 1918, The Chicago Daily News Co.]

Moscow, Russia, April 14.—How can the allies use present day Russia in winning the world war?

First, they must decide whether the soviet government is really a power in Russia; then, if such is the case, they must begin immediate co-operation with that government. This can be done either with or without actual official recognition.

Here are the soviet's reasons for expecting co-operation by the allies:

President Wilson, speaking with reference to Japan's question whether in the event that Russia signed a separate peace with Germany the allies would consider Russia neutral or an enemy, declared that America continued to regard Russia neither as a neutral nor as an enemy, but as an ally. The soviet government feels that it has the support of the majority of the Russian people. Therefore, if America continues to regard Russia as an ally she should co-operate with her ally's government.

See Germany as Russia's Enemy.

Further, Germany, the allies' enemy, probably will soon become again the active enemy of Russia. Russia recognized the soviet government as having sufficient power to sign a peace in the name of Great Russia. The soviet has now been in undisputed power for five months without serious armed opposition, except in the Ukraine, where the reactionary rada, mortgaged to Germany, is bolstered up by German divisions.

The soviet elements in the Ukraine are conducting an active guerrilla warfare against the Germans and the rada troops. They retook Odessa. The authority of the Russian soviet extends from Petrograd to Vladivostok and from Archangel to Baku. Only German or Japanese bayonets will prevent this soviet power from lasting many months longer.

The soviet signed what all Russia considers a shameful and humiliating peace and it evacuated the nation's capital and yet the soviet remains in power. The soviet offers to undergo any test the allies wish to suggest in order to demonstrate its good faith. To us in Russia these things with many others indicate that the soviet is sure of length of control. Recognition is not absolutely essential. The soviet desires the allies' recognition more than anything else in the world, but next it desires the allies' co-operation.

Allies' Agents Favor Co-Operation.

With insignificant exceptions the allies' military and diplomatic authorities in Russia now favor a policy of co-operation with the soviet government. Tentative co-operation has already begun on the recommendation of these representatives of the allies.

The soviet asks the aid of American and French officers in organizing a new revolutionary army. The soviet asks American and French aid in removing large stores of military munitions beyond the Volga, where they would be safely out of reach of the Germans should the latter again advance. The soviet asks the American railway men now in Harbin to come to Russia and actually assist in the physical evacuation of the munitions.

Forming a Revolutionary Army.

Three great phases appear in the present situation:

1. Previously I explained how the resentment against Germany is crystallizing the Russian revolutionary spirit into preparations for resuming the struggle against German imperialistic aggression. The soviet actually is raising, equipping, training and disciplining a revolutionary army, calling for volunteers and getting them. Nearly 300,000 men are now enrolled and old regime officers who have promised to refrain from engaging in politics are in command of this army. The army itself is gradually submitting to discipline, which after the terrible disorders in Russia itself is a distinct achievement.

In the Ukraine 200,000 irregulars with armed peasants and workmen are fighting

against the Germans. It was this force that recaptured Odessa. Thus Russia can be counted as a positive help, because a certain number of German troops have been recalled from the western front owing to the activities of the soviet irregular troops in the Ukraine.

New Democracy in Russia.

2. We find in Russia to-day the beginnings of an extensive democratic culture. The spirit of democracy extends deep in Russian life. It is intensely radical—almost unlovably so—but this democratic culture will automatically adjust itself to conditions as it grows older. The early days of the French revolution were infinitely more radical, but no one denies the influence of the French revolution on the democratization of the world.

In Russia to-day exists a new form of democracy, essentially Slavic in nature, because this democratic culture is not founded on plans or ideals transplanted from the western world, but on the basic principle of Slavic life, namely, the local village mir, or soviet, which even under the old autocracy preserved its ancient democratic spirit. The soviet government is the direct representative of 2,000 village mirs.

Any extreme or radical democracy in Russia is better than the old autocratic regime; better than a vassal government dictated in Berlin. If the allies are sincere in their fight for democracy they must help to preserve this radical government in Russia, which is really nothing but the birth of a new Slavic democracy. The allies have every reason to expect that the soviet democracy will grow more like their own.

Two Other Alternatives.

The outside world calls the soviet government a "proletarian dictatorship." Ninety-three per cent of the population belongs to the proletarian masses. When the soviet falls, as we in Russia see it, only one of two things can replace it. Either will return the czar with the iron hand or—and very much more probably—there will be established a vassal government through the force of German bayonets, which will reduce Russia to the state of a German colony. The allies are combating German kultur. We must

resist the German kultur which is struggling to penetrate Russia and crush the Slavic spirit of democracy. The soviet power will not be able to hold out long against Germany unaided.

If the allies strive to do so it may be possible to remodel or tone down this Russian democracy. Germany is contiguous and therefore has the advantage. Germany understands Russian psychology; the allies do not. Germany is pressing her advantage home. If the allies remain passive they inevitably will lose Russia not only for the purposes of the world war, but also for the purposes of world democracy. The loss of Russia to world democracy would mean the re-establishment of a solid block of world autocracies, including Japan, Germany and Russia

Russian Trade a Great Prize.

3. The third phase relates to the future of the trade of Russia. This is combined largely with the proposition that it is important immediately to prevent the export of foodstuffs to Germany. Russia is the world's largest market, but is secondary in production. It is an essentially agricultural country, importing 90 per cent of the manufactured articles needed. If the allies desert Russia now it means that we turn her over to Germany not only for the purposes of the war, but for the purposes of trade as well.

Russia embraces 180,000,000 people and one-sixth of the earth's populated surface. If Russian resentment against Germany, which is now growing by leaps and bounds, turns against the allies, our present good standing will be lost and Germany will be given such an advantage in the immediate purchase of raw materials as will prevent imports from other countries and the market will be permanently closed to the allies.

On the other hand, every dollar we spend in Russia now will return a hundredfold from foreign trade, because the money so spent will be used in building up a spirit of brotherhood between great democracies.

VI. HOW AMERICA CAN HELP RUSSIA.

SPECIAL CABLE TO THE DAILY NEWS.

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Moscow, Russia, April 15.—There are three positive things that the allies can do for Russia and incidentally for themselves in Russia. One is to foster Russian resentment against Germany and also encourage the revolutionary spirit for war. The second is to preserve in Russia the spirit of democracy for which the allies are fighting. Third, by saving the Russian democracy we shall shut out the Germans in large measure and open Russia for ourselves as the world's greatest future market for manufactured articles.

There are two negative things the allies can do. First, they should do nothing that will ultimately turn the country over to the Germans. Second, they should make no concerted invasion of Siberia and they should not permit Japan to invade Siberia, for such an invasion would immediately result in the turning of Russian resentment away from Germany and against the allies. The invasion of Siberia would result in the fall of the soviet government, a German controlled government replacing it in Europe and a Japanese controlled government replacing it in Siberia. Neither of these empires wishes Russian democracy to succeed. Autocracy is lonely. A Japanese invasion of Siberia either with or without the co-operation of the allies would be the most serious blow that could befall the allies in Russia.

Lenine Talks of War with Japan.

If we are able to assure the soviet government that such a move will not occur we shall see a wonderful change in the Russian situation in the next six months. The recent Japanese landing at Vladivostok gives an indication of Russian sentiment. Lenine, speaking the other day on this subject, said:

"We may have to declare war on Japan because the Japanese imperialists wish

to annex sections of free democratic Siberia. Serious complications with England and France would be probable and it may result in war should they, as allies of Japan, be unable to restrain her spoliation of Siberia."

Leon Trotzky says openly that Japan and Germany have reached an agreement, although, in view of Germany's attitude in the far east, that sounds improbable. Nevertheless, the soviet leaders declare that they intend to fight Japan should she continue the movement toward Siberia. They insist Japan has searched for numerous pretexts for an invasion of Siberia and the occupation of Vladivostok and the Siberian littoral.

German Prisoners Not Arming.

There were rumors for a time that German war prisoners in Siberia were arming themselves with the object of seizing the Trans-Siberian railroad. This was disproved by a special American and British committee of investigation. During the German drive on the western front the Japanese suggested that an invasion of Siberia might cause a diversion of German troops from that front. Any sane military judgment would disprove this theory, yet the Franco-British general staffs requested Gen. Pershing to use his influence in Washington to bring about the plan suggested.

When Japan shall invade Siberia here is what will happen in Russia:

First, the soviet will declare war on Japan and send against that country all available troops that are now preparing to fight against Germany.

Second, it will recall all the soviet troops now fighting a guerrilla warfare against Germany in the Ukraine and will send them to Siberia to fight against the Japanese. Such action will injure the western front, because the 200,000 soviet irregulars in the Ukraine are now detaining a certain number of German troops.

Third, the soviet will immediately appeal to Germany to aid Russia in fighting Japan, because, although Russian resentment against Germany is now growing by leaps and bounds, there exists a ready made resentment against Japan. That is the reason why Germany wants

Japan to invade Siberia. This would forestall the future conflict of Germany with the new revolutionary army and would turn a potential enemy of Germany into a certain ally.

How America May Co-Operate.

If America decides to give strong co-operation with the soviet forces, here is an immediate program that may be suggested:

1. Send American army officers of every branch of the military service numbering from forty to 200 for the purpose of helping to organize the new revolutionary army and advising its leaders regarding strategy.

2. Send five to ten oil experts—men who can get oil out of the ground—for the purpose of taking part in the reorganization of the Baku oil field.

3. Send five to ten coal experts to get coal out of the ground in the Donetz basin.

4. Send a commission on other natural industries like iron into the Urals, and so on.

5. Send a finance commission to aid the soviet in solving the Russian financial muddle, ignoring for the time being the repudiation of debts, which, I believe, will not be permanent. Our legal position regarding the repudiation is secure through the allied protest concerning it.

Buy Up Russian Products.

6. Send an industrial commission for the purpose of purchasing articles in Russia and shipping them to America, so as to prevent these articles from going to Germany. This will be in the nature of an extended blockade. Russia will exchange raw materials, such as flax, platinum, hides, and so on, on the basis of barter.

7. Appoint a commission in America for the purpose of arranging tonnage and selecting certain supplies and American manufactured articles, choosing those which Russia needs most and sending them to the Russian ports of Vladivostok, Archangel and Murmansk. In the same bottoms that bring the manufactured articles remove raw materials of equal value that would go to England.

8. Establish immediate credits in America for the purpose of purchasing manu-

factured articles intended for Russia, which would be exchanged for an equal value in raw materials on reaching a Russian port.

9. Prevent immediately the available natural resources of Russia from going to Germany through taking them ourselves and sending back to Russia just sufficient manufactured articles to pay for them. Thus Russia's debt to the allies will not be increased, while Germany will be deprived of large quantities of needed war material.

Hundred Americans on the Way.

Some allied co-operation has already been started. To-day there are five allied military missions working that are close in the confidence of Trotzky and other leaders engaged in organizing the new revolutionary army. One hundred American railway operators are traversing Manchuria on their way to help the soviet actually to evacuate munitions from Petrograd to points beyond the Volga and out of reach of the Germans should they again advance. The soviet is showing extreme willingness to place the munitions beyond the reach of the Germans. This of itself should be evidence of its good faith.

Here is a general summary of the situation: The bolsheviks used socialistic formulas for the purpose of obtaining control of the soviet's organization and ousting Kerensky. The soviet power is permanent, unless it is deposed by German or Japanese imperialistic force. The soviet government to-day is not socialistic. Neither is it a proletariat dictatorship, because the soviet government is founded on the power of the soviet organization, which, in turn, is founded on a Slav basis, the principle of which is democracy or the village mir.

Ninety-three per cent of the people belong to the proletariat or the peasant masses. The other 7 per cent are monarchists, nobles, capitalists and landowners. These are the ones who complain of a proletariat dictatorship.

Russian Democracy Will Not Die.

Russia is rather suffering from birth pains than death throes. The soviet is championing a new form of democracy. While essentially different from the

Anglo-Saxon idea, it is real democracy nevertheless, which, with the passage of time, will certainly spread into Slavic Austria. Democracy is the idea underlying the allies' struggle. The Russian soviet's democracy will never die, regardless of the allied attitude. The country is strong for freedom, but unless the allies support it perhaps Germany or Japan will succeed either in stifling or rifling it.

Democratic Russia is getting angry with Germany for the first time since the world war began. The Russians now feel Germany as an individual menace; previously they thought Germany menaced only the czar.

The western world does not seem to understand Japan's landing at Vladivostok. Japan's movement toward Siberia threatens to turn Russian resentment from Germany to Japan and Japan's allies, because the allies are unable to check Japan.

Situation Better for the Allies.

The Russian situation is better for the allies to-day than at any other time since the revolution began. There are potentialities that will materially aid us to win the world war. Had we known Russian psychology or spent as much time studying Russia as Germany spent we should have understood. We were like the boy testing the water with his big toe, hesitating to take the plunge.

Let us get aboard. Let us play our ally's government for better or for worse, lest Germany beat us to it!

The Chicago Daily News' Foreign News Staff

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